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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TIIE STATE OF UTAH

ROYAL RESOURCES, INC.,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

No. 15817

GIBRALTER FINANCIAL CORP.,
GIBRALTER SECURITIES CORP.,
(a wholly owned subsidiary of
Gibralter Financial Corp.,)
LYNN DIXON, and GEORGE PERRY,
Defendants-Appellants.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a decision granting plaintiffrespondent judgment in the sum of $10,400 plus interest and
costs,
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The plaintiff-respondent, Royal Resources, Inc., filed
suit in the Third District Court on November 24, 1975,
against Gibralter Financial Corp., Gibralter Securities
Corp., a wholly owned subsidiary of Gibralter Financial
Corp., Lynn Dixon and George Perry, seeking damages for
monies had and received by the defendants.

On June 17, 1976

plaintiff's amended complaint (R. 9, 10) was duly filed
seeking judgment in the sum of $10,680 plus interest and
costs from the defendants jointly and individually.

An

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
answer denying
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liability of Lynn Dixon and George
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Perry was duly filed.

(R. 11, 12)

On July 12, 1977, trial

was held by the Honorable Ernest Baldwin, Jr. , Judge, (R. 11
and on July 22, 1977, judgment was entered in favor of
plaintiff-respondent against the corporate defendants

in~

sum of $10,680 plus interest and costs and trial was
reserved by stipulation against the individual defendants
and the court approved stipulation that the defendants wooU
cooperate fully with plaintiff- respondent's attempts to seek
federal insurance compensation with SCIPIC (R.24,25) On
December 9, 1977, plaintiff- respondent moved for production
of documents and order pursuant to Rule 34, Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure (R. 26-33) granted by the Honorable DavidB.
Dee, Judge, on December 13, 1977.

(R. 39).

On February 24,

1978, plaintiff-respondent again moved for production of
documents from defendants (R. 35, 36).

On March 6, 1978,

the Honorable David K. Winder, Judge, granted said motion
and order (R. 39) allowing 20 days for production.

Defe~·

ants thereupon provided plaintiff-respondent with a computer
printout daily transaction report (Exhibit 4-P) and copies
of Gibralter checks to Royal Resources (Exhibit 5-P).

Non·

jury trial was held as to the liability of the individual
defendants on April 19, 1978, before the Honorable Jay E.
Banks, Judge.

At the time of trial, deferidant George Perry

was dismissed from the action (R. 41) and judgment was
awarded in favor of plaintiff-respondent against appellant
Dixon in the sum of $10 ,400 plus interest and costs (R. 48).
The appellant has appealed the judgment of the trial court.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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I

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment
of the lower court together with all costs.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On or about November 24, 1975, plaintiff-respondent
filed a complaint (R.2) subsequently amended (R.9) with the
Third District Court for the State of Utah against Gibralter
Securities Corp., Lynn Dixon and George Perry.
The aforesaid suit sought repayment of loans from the
defendants individually and jointly in the following
amounts:

$1,000
($680 unpaid principal and $320 unpaid
fee), on an April 11, 1975 loan to defendant
Gibralter Securities Corp., and interest thereon.
$10,400
($10,000 unpaid principal and $400
unpaid fee on an April 16, 1975 loan to defendant
Lynn Dixon. (Exhibits 1-P & 2-P)
Said loans had been made pursuant to an ongoing business relationship between plaintiff and defendants to make
early settlements (Tr. 57) on stock sales.

This business

involved a practice whereby Royal Resources would advance
money by way of ~arly settlement for a stock sale so that an
individual seller would realize his money before the normal
seven day period.

This early payment was discounted and

Royal Resources would be paid at the end of the non:ial seven
day period (Tr 57 to 60).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Under the normal course of business Royal Resources
advanced money to customers of Gibralter Securities and
received an assignment of the proceeds of the customers
stock sale (Tr. 64).

Royal Resources' Mr. Woolley would be

verbally assured by officers and/or employees of Gibralter

I
I

Securities that the customer had sold the stock and the pro· I
I
I

ceeds were forthcoming before he would issue a check for
early settlement (Tr.65).

At the end of the seven day

period Gibralter Securities would issue a check to Royal
Resources to cover the transaction with the proceeds from
the sale.
The transaction in question in the present suit occured
when Mr. Wooley was told the stock sale had been made
(Tr.65) and issued the two checks to Lynn Dixon (Exhibits
1-P and 2-P), but subsequently received no repayment.
At the time of this transaction Lynn Dixon was Presi·
dent (Tr.75) and Registered Agent of Gibralter Securities.
Mr. Woolley made several requests for payment by Gibralter
Securities (Tr. 84) with no result. Royal Resources then
commenced this suit.
During the latter part of 1976, plaintiff-respondent
investigated, at its own initiative and with the encourage·
ment of the individual defendants through their counsel,
Jerry V. Strand, the possibility of recovering or being
compensated from the federal insurance program, SCIPIC.

To

make such a claim it was necessary to secure the cooperati~
of the defendants.

Therefore, plaintiff-respondent sought

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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judgment against the corporate defendants and court approved
stipulation of the parties that defendants would cooperate
with plaintiff's attempts for federal insurance compensation. On or about July 12, 1977, (R. 19) judgment was
awarded plaintiff against the defendant corporations in the
sum of $10,680 plus interest and costs.

The court further

adjudged:

"(2) The trial of the remaining issues involving
individual defendants is hereby continued without
date, the court approving stipulation of the
parties that defendants will cooperate fully with
SCIPIC for the purpose of plaintiff seeking a
federal insurance compensation for its loss
herein." (R. 24)
Cooperation not forthcoming, on or about December 13,
1977, plaintiff-respondent's filed a motion for production
of documents and order to permit inspection and copying of
all records of transactions between defendants and plaintiff
during the period January 1, 1975, to June 30, 1975,
specifically the transactions of defendants Dixon, Perry and
three other individuals.

(R. 26-33).

Defendants' continued failure to produce documents and
lack of cooperation forced plaintiff to move again on
February 24, 1978 to compel defendants to comply with the
July 22, 1977, judgment and to produce documents requested.
(R. 35, 36)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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On or about March 6, 1978, plaintiff-respondent's motion
granted by the Honorable David K. Winder, Judge, with 20

days given to produce the documents and to aid plaintiff's
effort to recover from SCIPIC.

(R. 39)

The only documents produced by defendants were copies
of computer printouts called Gibralter Securities Daily
Transaction Report for Royal Resources and copies of
Gibralter checks to Royal Resources. (Exhibits 4-P & 5-P),
No other corporate or personal records requested by plain·
tiff were produced by defendants. Defendant Dixon's affi·
davit of July 6, 1977, was also received.

(R. 37, 38)

Dixon

claimed not to be the custodian of records for Gibralter
Financial Corp., or Gibralter Securities Corp., even
he was the President of the corporation.

(Tr. 75)

thou~

Further,

he never produced records of his personal account which

~

later admitted, when questioned by the court, were in his
possession.

(Tr. 71 & 74)

Plaintiff-Respondent intended to assert to SCIPIC (R.
24) that it stood in the place of Gibralter's customer,
either defendant Dixon himself or his client and recover iU
loss through the federal insurance program.

To make this

claim plaintiff-respondent needed to secure the cooperatioo
of defendants and the records necessary to find out what
happened to the proceeds of the two checks to Lynn Dixon.
(Exhibits 1-P and 2-P)

All efforts to secure additional

documents and cooperation were fruitless.

·Plaintiff-

respondent could not find out if the proceeds of the chec~,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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payable to and cashed by the defendant Dixon (R.57), went to
him personally, to a client of his, or to the corporate
defendants.

Indeed Dixon's recollections on the subject

are, to say the least, hazy (Tr. 67 to 75).

The only evi-

dence available (Plaintiff's exhibit 3-P) indicates five
transactions between Royal Resources and Lynn Dixon.

(Royal

Resources checks No. 36, January 10, 1975; No. 85, March 5,
1975; No. 122, April 7, 1975; No. 136 and 137, April 16,
1975 [the transaction at issue]; and No. 163, May 22, 1975.)
Only one (No. 36) indicates that the transaction was for an
individual other than defendant Dixon; in this case L. W.
Fransden.
Though plaintiff's agent, Mr. Woolley, had been told by
officers and/or

employ~es

of Gibralter that stock had been

sold in the April 16, 1975 transaction (Tr. 65), plaintiff's
efforts to secure records which would show what stock, if
any, was in fact sold and by whom, were fruitless.

In fact,

respondent could not find out anything from the defendant
corporations or defendants Dixon and Perry, personally or as
President and Registered Agent of the corporations, which
would allow it to proceed on an insurance claim with SCIPIC.
The Daily Transacton Record and copies of Gibralter
Securities checks to Royal Resources (Exhibits 4-P & 5-P)
show other transactions between Royal Resources and
Gibralter both before and after the April 16, 1978 transaction but it does not show a record of this transaction.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Respondent, being fully frustrated with lhe lack of
cooperation of the defendants, sought individual recovery
from the defendants.

!

On or about April 19, 1978, trial was I

held before The Honorable Jay E. Banks, Judge.

Defendant

George Perry was dismissed from the case (Tr. 56) and the
personal liability of defendant Dixon was at issue.
The Court's relevant Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law (R. 46 & 47) are:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. That the sum of $10 ,400 is uncontroverted.
3. That essential records of defendants were not
produced pursuant to discovery or at the trial of
this case.
4. That the facts surroundng the transaction in this
case, in the absence of clarifying documents, were
particularly within the province and knowledge of
defendant Dixon, in his dual role of President and
customer's man or agent.
5. That the checks payable to defendant, in the
absence of documents or sufficient evidence to the
contrary, support a finding of monies had and received
by Dixon.
6. That failure to produce such documents raises a
presumption that their contents are adverse to
position of defendants.
7. That plaintiff's prima facie case shifted the
burden of proof to defendants, a burden they did not
meet.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
2. That failure to produce essential documents throu~
discovery and at trial is construed as a matter of law
to deem the .contents thereof adversly to defendants.
3, That defendants failed to meet the burden of proof,
which shifted to them.
4. That defendant Lynn Dixon is liable personally to
plaintiffs for money had and received and that
judgment should be awarded against him personally in
favor of plaintiffs in the sum of $10,400 plus 6% to
April 19, 1978, plus costs.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Judge Banks in awarding judgment to the plaintiff
stated:

" ... there's no question about that if they accept an
assignment they are looking to the assignee, but the
thing that disturbs me here, you've got a man here with
two hats.
Use the corporation when he wants to .
. .. He's in the position where he can control - - it's a
lax thing, these transactions.
But sooner or later
there's got to be some written evidence of something
here ... One, if it's -- if he's acting as the corporation, and he's President at this time, he's got company
accounts.
You've got your own accounts.
Broker deals
through his own accounts, through brokers accounts, but
someplace there's got to be some records. That's the
thing that disturbs me on it.
If it's a company
account, I mean an assignment, and so forth, someplace
within that week there's got to be some records in his
own account, either an assignment or someting to show
what he's got to do. .
And I think there's a little heavier burden on
somebody that's President of the company working
through his own account as a customer and assigning.
He's in control of the situation whether it's
company ... but as President of the company he's privy to
everything that's going on in the company. He's
certainly privy to his own account. They made an
effort to secure some records of that.
It's a failure of production of any records on
this situation. He's in the position to maneuver .
. . . I think that under the situation that he--he
either through the company or through his own records
would have to show that this was actually assi~
over to the company and it wasn't maneuvered.
I'll award judgment to the plaintiff. (Tr. 89
and 90)
(Emphasis added)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY HELD
APPELLANT PERSONALLY LIABLE
FOR FUNDS HAD AND RECEIVED
Defendant-appellant relies on Comment a of the
Restatement of Agency 2d, §320, to urge that he is not a
party to the transaction, only the principal is.

The

language of the cited material (Appellant's brief p. 9)
reads in part:

" .•. In the absence of other facts, the inference is
that the parties have agreed that the principal is,
the agent is not, a party." (Emphasis added)

a~

The record, however, is notoriously slient on whether
Gibralter received the proceeds of the alleged stock sale,
whether defendant paid over to a stock seller customer the
funds advanced for "early settlement" by plaintiff, or
whether defendant Dixon kept the proceeds. Dixon testified
there were no records on the transaction except his personal
account which he did not produce (Tr. 74, 7 5).

This despite

the fact that plaintiff-respondent had often sought such
records. (Plaintiffs July 22, 1977 Judgment and Order
(R. 24); December 9, 1977 Motion for Production of Documents
and Order (R. 26-33); December 13, 1977 Order (R. 34);
February 24, 1978 Motion and Notice (R.35); and March 6,
1978 Order (R. 39).

The only evidence available, Dee

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Woolley's journal (Plaintiff's exhibit 3-P), shows that the
usual course of conduct was for Royal Resources to issue
checks directly to individual stock seller customers of
Gibralter.

It is clear from the exhibit that in these rare

instances when Mr. Woolley issued checks to the customers
man for a client, that he would so designate by indicating
the name of the customers man and the client.

See Royal

Resources Exhibit P-3 checks no. 36, January 10, 1975 (R.
28); No. 65, February 14, 1975 (R. 29); No. 120, April 4,
1975 (R. 31); and No. 133, April 11, 1975 (R. 32).

On only

one of the five transactions between Royal Resources and
Lynn Dixon is there indicated that the transaction was for a
third party.
1975).

(Royal Resources check No. 36, January 10,

The other four transactions, including the April 16,

1975, transaction at issue, have no such designation.
Without defendant Dixon's records it is impossible to determine where the money went in any of the transactions.
Defendant corporations bookkeeper Lois Crowder's testimony was that there had to have been a stock transaction and
that the funds were held by Gibralter in a general account
and not paid over to plaintiff because Gibralter went broke.
(Tr. 79, 80)

But again, with the evidence available (only

Exhibits 4-P & 5-P had been received by plaintiff pursuant
to discovery) she was unable to show any entry corresponding
to an allegation that defendant Dixon made a stock

trans~

action or that the funds found their way into the Gibralter
general account. (Tr 76, 78, 80)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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We can only conclude that the funds did not reach
Gibralter's general account, and for whatever unexplained
reasons, Lynn Dixon was, in this instance, acting for him·
self.
Appellant, further asserting his view, cites:

Generally, an agent is not responsible for money had
and received where the money is paid over by the agent
to his principal. 3 Am Jur 2d Agency, §§301, 302.
(Defendant-Appellant's Brief, P. 10)

I

I

Plaintiff-respondent does not disagree with this as a

1

general statement of the law, but, again, the record fails
to reveal any facts supporting an allegation that funds ever
reached the principal, a third party customer or Gibralter.
If in fact the corporate defendant was the principal,
defendant Dixon as its President is not the average "agent".
It is well established that under various circumstances

t~

corporate veil can be pierced to get at officers or direc·
tors when the facts warrant the application of equitable
principles to go behind the corporate personality to the
individual.

(See Henn on Corporations §§146, 147 at 250-~

2d Ed. 1970)
In Shepherd v. Bering Sea Originals, 578, P2d. §587,
590 (Alaska, 1978), the Alaska Supreme Court discussed dis·
regarding the corporate entity and stated:

"There are many decisions in which courts have piei;ced
the 'veil of corporate fiction' ... Generally speaking,
such decisions have been based on the requirements of,
justice or to prevent fraud, bad faith or other wrong.
ommitted.)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney(Citations
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for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain
12 errors.

I

I

1

In Amoco Chemicals Corp. v. Bach, 222 Kan. 589, 567
P2d 1337, 1341-42 (1977), the Kansas Supreme Court set forth
a list of factors which it would consider in

disregarding

the corporation function:

"An examination of the cases discloses that some of the
factors considered significant in justifying a disregard of the corporate entity are:
(1) Undercapitalization of one man corporation;
(2) Failure to obscure
corporate formalities;
(3) Nonpayment of dividends;
(4) Siphoning of corporate funds by the dominant stockholder;
(5) Nonfunctioning of other officers or
directors;
(6) Absence of corporate records;
(7) Use
of the corporation as a facade for operations of the
dominant stockholder or stockholders; and (8) The
use of the corporate entity in promoting injustrceor fraud.
(Emphasis added)
And in Burns vs. Norwesco Marine, Inc., 13 Wash. App.
414, 535 P.2d 860, 863 (1975), the Washington Supreme Court
stated:

Although the facts have varied from case to case, the
corporation entity has been disregarded when it is used
to perpetuate a fraud or wrong, gain an unjust advantage or evade an obligation (numerous citations
ommitted) ... in some jurisdictions, directors and
officers of a corporation may be held directly liable to
corporate creditors for breaches of duty owed the
corporation, especially during the corporation's insolvency. This may include acts of neglect. 19 C.J.S.
Corporations §846 (1940).
See also Henn, Agency-Partnership at 117, (1972) Agents
liability where principal is non-existant.
Failure of an officer to differentiate between personal
activities and those of the corporation would certainly be
grounds to "pierce the corporate veil" and establish
personal
liability
thefor officer.
Sponsored
by the S.J. Quinney
Law Library.on
Funding
digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Defendant Dixon's testimony is unclear on exactly what
happened concerning the April 16, 1975 transaction.

He

stated the stock was sold in his account (Tr. 67, Line 11),
that he was not clear whether or not the stock was sold in
his account (Tr. 67, Line 15), that he didn't know if the
stock was in his account or someone else's (Tr. 70, 71);
that he didn't recall who he wired the money to (Tr. 70),
that he was unclear what happened to the money (Tr. 75),
that he didn't know what stock it was (Tr. 69) and that a
trade ticket would identify the particular trade (Tr. 68).
The only evidence, before the trial court, of what

happen~

to this particular transaction is Royal Resources journal
(Exhibit 3-P) and the only individual indicated was defendant Dixon.

While it is not clear from the evidence which capacity
defendant Dixon was acting in (personally, agent for
Gibralter, agent for a third party customer), it is clear
that he had control of the records, as President of the
corporation or his personal records, which could shed light
on the transaction, and that he failed to produce such
records.

(Tr. 71, 74)

Defendant's failure to produce requested documents,
records and his lack of cooperation thwarted plaintiff's
efforts to recover from SCIPIC (July 12, 1977 Judgment (R.
24), and further brought about the trial court's finding of
fact #6 and #7 shifting the burden to the defendant to sh~
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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what actually happened as well as the finding that defendant
did not meet the burden. (R. 47)

It is clear that neither

the exhibits nor the record herein offer any compelling
explanation of what really happened to the sums advanced.
By the weight of appellant's own cited authority, he is not
in this case entitled to the protection ordinarily afforded
an agent for a disclosed principal.
While plaintiff-respondent, in amending (R.9, 10) its
original complaint (R. 2, 3), thought that defendant Dixon
was acting as agent for defendant Perry (Perry was dismissed
at trial R. 46, 47, 48; Tr. 56), plaintiff still kept a
cause of action against Dixon individually:

(8) That defendants are liable jointly and individually for monies had and received, or in the alternative are unjustly enriched in the amount claimed.
or if defendant Perry was actually the undisclosed principal
(a fact that could not be ascertained by discovery through
either individual defendant) there still would be a clear
cause of action against defendant Dixon.

Plaintiff's

Amended Complaint states:

(7) That defendant Dixon is liable individually in
that he was acting as an agent of George Perry in his
personal, not corporate capacity; ... (R. 10)
Accordingly, this Court should affirm the judgment of
the trial court for plaintiff-respondent.
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POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED
THAT FAILURE ON PART OF APPELLANT
TO PRODUCE DOCUMENTS AND RECORDS
RAISED A PRESUMPTION THl'.T THE
INFORI1ATION SOUGHT WAS UNFAVORABLE
TO APPELLANT.
It is well settled that failure to comply with the
Court's pre-trial discovery order may result in a presurnp·
tion that the concealed information is unfavorable to the
defendant.

In 31 C. J. S. Evidence §156(b) it is stated:
I

"The unexplained failure or refusal of a party to
judicial proceedings to produce relevant and competent
documentary evidence or an article which would tend to
throw light on the issues authorizes, under certain
circumstances, an inference or a presumption unfavor·
able to such party.

I
I

Possession or control of such evidence by the
party against whom the inference or presumption is
sought to be invoked, is necessary; the rule does not
apply where the evidence is equally available to botl
parties. Further, it must appear that there has been
an actual suppression or withholding of the evidence;
no unfavorable inference arises where the circumstances
indicate that the document or article in question has
been lost or accidentally destroyed, or where the
failure to produce it is otherwise properly accounted
for."
In fact, such failure can result in as stringent a
I
Rasbury v. Bainum, 15 Utah 2d'

result as awarding judgment.
62, 387 P2d 239 ( 1963).

This court in Tucker v. Nunley, 16

Utah 2d. 97, 396 P.2d 410 at 412 (1964) established the
following standard:
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"We recognize that the granting of a judgment
against a party solely for disobeying an order to
cooperate in discovery procedure is a stringent measure
which should be employed with caution and restraint and
only where the failure has been willful and the
interest of justice so demands. Except in very aggravated cases, less serious sanctions undoubtedly could
be applied to accomplish the desired result, particularly where there is any likelihood of injustice by
depriving a party of a meritorious cause of action or
defense. Whether the failure to comply with the
court's order has been willful and whether the
circumstances are so aggravated as to justify the
action taken is primarily for the trial court to
determine. Unless it is shown that his action is
without support in the record, or is a plain abuse or
discretion, it should not be disturbed." (Emphasis
added)
Plaintiff-appellant attempted on several occasions
(plaintiff's Motion for Production of Documents and Order
December 9, 1977, (R. 26) and the Court's order of December
13, 1977 (R. 39); plaintiff's second motion February 24,
1978, (R. 35) and the Court's Order of March 6, 1978) to get
corporate and personal record of the defendants.

Defendants

produced a computer printout daily transaction sheet
(Exhibit 4-P) and copies of checks from Gibralter to Royal
Resources (Exhibit 5-P) and defendant Dixon's Affidavit
(R-37) stating that he did not have custody of any documents.

It remains a mystery how defendant could produce the

Royal Resources daily transaction records and none of the
daily transaction' records for Richard Macon, Lynn Dixon,
Scott Taylor, M. C. Mason and George Perry called for in
plaintiff's Motion for Production of Documents (R. 26).

It

is also unanswered why no personal records of at least the
defendants Perry and Dixon were ever produced.

Dixon in
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fact admitted he had his own records (Tr. 71). The requested I
records were a necessary part of plaintiff's attempt to
recover insurance from SC IP IC (as ordered July 22, 1977, R.
24).

Plaintiff, both on its own initiative and after urging

from defendants' counsel, Jerry V. Strand, was attempting to

build a case that it stood in the place of the customer to I
whom it made the early settlement, as that customer surely
would have been covered by the federal insurance.

Plaintifi

needed to know what stock was involved and who sold it,
Dixon or a third person who was Dixon's client.
Dixon, his records would so indicate.

If it was

If it was his client

he still should have, as the customer's man, some record of
it.

If it, in fact, involved the corporate defendants,

Dixon as President should have had access to the records.
Clearly in this case the trial court could justify

t~

Findings of Fact (Tr. 46-47)
3.
4.

6.

7.

That essential records of defendants were
not produced pursuant to discovery or at
the trial of this case.
That the facts surrounding the transactions
in this case, in the absence of clarifying
documents, were peculiarly within the province
and knowledge of defendant Dixon, in his dual
role of President and customer's man or agent.
That the failure to produce such documents of
the transactions raises a presumpton that
their contents are adverse to the position of
defendants.
That plaintiff's prima facie case shifted
the burden of proof to defendants, a burden
which they did not meet.

and could have awarded judgment for plaintiff solely on
defendants' refusal to produce.
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1

Further, plaintiff-respondent notes that Rasbury and
Tucker merely affirms the extent of the power of the trial
court if not abused.

In the instant case the trier of fact

did not award judgment on the failure to produce alone, it
merely shifted the burden to the defendant.
It is clear that the trier of fact may draw an unfavorable inference or there may be raised a presumption
with reference to a failure to produce documents.

(See

Londerholm and NAACP v. Unified School District No. 500, 199
Kan. 312, 430 P.2d 188 at 197 (1967); Whitney v.
Canadian Bank of Commerce, 374 P.2d 441 at 442 (Oregon
1962); State Tax Commission v. Graybar Electric Co., 86
Ariz. 253, 344 P.2d 1008 at 1011 (1959); Shehtanian

v. Kenny, 156 Cal. App. 2d 516, 319 P.2d 699 at 702 (1958);
Talbert v. Ostergaard, 276 P.2d 880 at 884,5 (Cal. 1954);
Bengston v. Shain, 255 P.2d 892 at 895 (Wash 1953);
Williams v. Cor.unercial Nat. Bank of Portland, 90 P. 1012
(Oregon 1907). Such failure, quoting appellant's own cited
authorities, does shift the burden and raises "an inference
or a presumption unfavorable to such party" (31 C.J.S.
Evidence, §156(b).

We concede the rule does not apply

"where the evidence is equally available to both parties"
id.

However, the trial court here clearly found such was

not thE: case, and indeed that "the facts surrounding the
transaction in this case, in the absence of clarifying
documents, were peculiarly within the province and knowledge
of ... "

(R. 46) defendant Dixon.

The Court found, and as
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trier of the fact, was entitled to find, that the failure

I

~I

produce documents raises a presumption that their contents
were adverse to defendants (R. 46-47) and that in the
absence of documents or evidence to the contrary, a conclusion that the monies were had and received by defendant
Dixon was proper.

This failure to produce documents

!

shif~I

the burden of proof to defendant and he failed to meet that I
burden.

(R. 46-47)

Appellant urges that he had no access to the records
Gibralter and that they were equally accessible to respond·
ent.

The record clearly fails to support that.

Defendant

Dixon was President of Gibralter (Tr. 75) as well as its
registered agent.

Who else, if not he, would have access1

Nor did he or others provide respondent with access despite
strenuous efforts to compel discovery.
Appellant further urges that the trial court herein
relieved respondent of plaintiff's burden to prove its

cl~

and substituted a negative inference as substantive proof.
We submit that whether the non-production of evidence is a

1

I

mere inference or a true presumption, the trial court did
not err.

It is obvious from the record that the court founi

plaintiff's evidence credible and supportive of a prima
facie case.
shifts.

Having produced such evidence, the burden

Citing appellant's Utah authority, we direct the

Court's attention to the three concluding paragraphs of
Keesling v. Basamakis, 539 P.2d, 1043 (Utah 1975):
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!

The proponent of a proposition has two
burdens relative to his proof:
to produce
evidence which proves or tends to prove the
proposition asserted; and to persuade the
trier of fact that his evidence is more
credible or entitled to the greater weight.
Once the proponent has produced such evidence,
the burden of producing evidence disproving
or tending to disprove the proposition shifts
to the opponent, and he must introduce such
evidence as may be necessary to avoid the risk
of a directed verdict or a peremptory finding
against him as to the existence of the proposition.
The burden of persuasion does not shift,
however, and remains upon the party asserting the
proposition. Thus, where, as here, the proponent
has the burden of persuading the trier of fact by
a preponderance of the evidence, that it, that the
asserted proposition is more likely than not, he
carries that burden throughout the trial. Having
adduced sufficient evidence to show or tending to
show the existence of the proposition, and having
thus met his burden of production, he nevertheless
suffers the risk of nonpersuasion or disbelief.
Plaintiff produced evidence tending to prove
the existence of a partnership. Defendant produced
opposing evidence and further produced evidence
which tended to prove a joint venture of the nature
heretofore described. The trial court, exercising
_its prerogative as a trier of fact in a nonjury
£ase, weighed the credibility: of the witnesses,
2n_d___~<!§_no~rsuaded by plain ti ff' s evi_Ii~_nc~
This court will not disturb such_a_determina.t.ion_
when reasQ~abl~eD_Q_Qllld differ as to the weight
to be _given to conflictinE evidence.
(Citations
ommitted~)- (Emphasis added)
The court's finding did not rest upon the non-production of documents alone, but rather, having found plaintiff's claim of monies had and received credible, shifted
the burden to respondent.

The non-production of documents

giving rise to a presumption that the matters therein are
unfavorable to him.

Plaintiff-respondent need not urge that

such presumption supplies a missing link in the case alone
or that it is independent evidence of a fact otherwise
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unproved.

It remains uncontroverted

and received by appellant.

th~t

monies were had

A shift to the appellant to

explaint that liability rested elsewhere was justified.
This he failed to do by any compelling affirmative, probative evidence. Thus, coupled with the presumption to be
drawn from non-production of documents, he cannot and should
not prevail.
As this court, in Koesling, after noting the state of
the law, distinguishing the burdens of producing evidence
and of persuading the trier of fact, concluded:
"The trial court, exercising its prerogative as a trier of fact in a nonjury case,
weighed the credibility of the witnesses, and
was not persuaded by plaintiff's evidence.
This court will not disturb such a determination when reasonable men could differ as to
the weight to be given to conflicting evidence."
(Emphasis added)
This court should affirm the judgment of the trial
court for plaintiff-respondent.
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POINT Ill
RESPONDENT WAS NOT PRECLUDED FROM
JUDGMENT AGAINST APPELLANT WHEN IT
TOOK JUDGMENT AGAINST THE CORPORATE
DEFENDANTS.
The record is clear that defendants agreed to fully
cooperate with plaintiff to seek redress in the form of
federal insurance compensation through SCIPIC.

Indeed,

previous counsel for defendants, Jerry V. Strand, urged that
plaintiff take judgment against the corporate defendants to
support such a claim (R. 24).

Pursuit of such a clam failed

in large part, due to failure of defendants to produce
documents.

It is also clear from the record that plaintiff

made no "election" which would preclude action against
defendant Dixon.
8.

Plaintiff's amended complaint sought:

That defendants are liable jointly and
individually for monies had and received,
or in the alternative, are unjustly
enriched in the amount claimed. (R. 10)

and prays for judgment against defendants jointly and individually.

It is further clear that the Honorable Ernest F.

Baldwin, Jr., taking the stipulated default judgment against
the corporate defendants, acknowledged that the "big question is individual liability" (minute entry R. 17, 18) and
also by stipulation that all rights were reserved against
the individual defendants.

See minute entry R. 17, 18, 19

and Judgment and Order which states:
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The trial of the remaining issues
involving individual defendants is
hereby continued without date, the
court approving stipulation of the
parties that defendants herein will
cooperate fully with SCIPIC for the
purpose of plaintiff seeking federal
insurance compensation for its loss
herein.
(R. 24)

As argued before, at that point in these proceedings,
plaintiff-respondent was not privy to sufficient facts to
fully make its case to SCIPIC.

Hence its subsequent efforts I

I

to compel discovery.
Respondent further submits that the law requires appel·
lant to have moved to compel respondent to elect.
Costello v. Kasteler, 7 Utah 2d 310, 324 P.2d. 772
(1958) is cited by appellant as follows:
"Appellants further contend that the court
erred in granting judgment against both of them
since the court found that at the time of the
negotiations for the services appellant Kasteler
did not disclose to respondent that he was acting
as the agent for the appellant Uranium Chemical
Corporation and the law is well settled that where
a contract is entered into with the agent of an
undisclosed principal for the use and benefit
of the principal an election must be made as to
whether the agent or the principal will be held
liable, but a judgment cannot be obtained against
both. As authority appellant cites Love v. St.
Joseph Stock Yards Co., 51 Utah 305, 169 P. 951.
That case does contain a dictum to that effect
and respondent concedes that the majority rule
in the United States is to the effect that
after discovery of an undisclosed principal a
judgment cannot ordinarily be obtained against
both the principal and the agent. As stated
in 118 A.L.R., page 704, note 111:
'It has generally been held
that where the agent and undisclosed
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principal are joined, the plaintiff
may not have judgment againt both,
but must, prior to judgment, elect to
hold one or the other.'
Ordinarily plaintiff would not be entitled to judgment
against both."
but appellant fails to conclude the court's finding:

Ordinarily plaintiff would not be entitled
to judgment against both. However, appellants
did not demand or move for an election by
respondent as to whether the principal or
agent should be held and the failure to do so
was a waiver.
See note lll(b), 118 A.L.R. page
707 and cases therein cited. Since respondent
in his brief has stated that if this court
should find that he is not entitled to judgment
against both appellants then he requests that
he be allowed to make his election in this
court and chooses to hold the agent Kasteler.
We deem it proper to grant this request.
Affirmed with instructions to vacate the
judgment against appellant Uranium Chemical
Corporation.
It is clear that appellant must move to compel respondent to
elect.

In the instant case no such demand or move was made,

and appellants failure, under Costello, constitutes a waiver
by him.
Appellant cites the Restatement of Contract §119(1):

"A judgment rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction within the United States against
one or more joint promisors, or against one or
more joint and several promisors, upon a joint
promise, discharges the joint duty of the other
joint promisors."
And 3 AmJur. 2d Agency, §309:
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"[T]he rule followed almost universally is
that if the third party, after learnin~
facts and the identify of the principal,
brings suit and recovers judgment against the
agent, this is an election against the agent
which will bar a subsequent action agajnst
the principal, regardless of whether the
judgment is or is not satisfied. A judgment
against the principal will likewise have the
effect of barring a subsequent action by the
third person against the agent.''
(Emphasis
added.)
as further authority for his position.

It is apparent that

a requirement for election is knowledge of the identity of
the principal.

If this is the case, respondent could not

have made an election because it was unable to determine
through discovery, who, if not Dixon, the undisclosed
principal was.

In fact, appellant is arguing that he is the agent of
Gibralter.

Plaintiff urges that as President, Registered

Agent and customer's man, he still must be held personally
liable.

He alone was in a position to show what actually

happened and he would not do so.
Accordingly, this Court should affirm the judgment of
the trial court for plaintiff-respondent.
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POINT IV

A REVIEWING COURT WILL NOT DISTURB
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS IF THERE
IS REASONABLE BASIS IN EVIDENCE OR
LACK OF EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THEM.

It is a well established rule that the appellant
carries the burden of showing a substantial basis for upsetting the trial court's findings and judgment.

This court in

Elwell & Son, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 27 Utah 2d 188,
493 P.2d 1283 (1972) held that with respect to a lower
court's verdict and judgment "all presumptions favor their
validity." Elwell case parallelled the present case in that
in both instances the records concerning the original
controversy were incomplete.

In Elwell, an action by a

contractor against the city and railroads to recover money
allegedly due beyond contractual amount for installation of
sewer lines, the determination of the trial court, although
based on incomplete information, was sustained since appellant could not overcome the presumption that favors the
trial court's finding.
Similarly in Holman v. Sorenson, 556 P.2d 499 (Utah
1976) an action contractors brought to foreclose a mechanic 1 s lien and to recover damages for breach of contract,
this court held that the finding of damages would not be
overturned since evidence could be found to support the
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trial court's findings.

This court again relied on the

theory that appellants carry the burden of showing from the
record that the trial court erred.

A number of other Utah

cases support the rule that if there is a reasonable basis
either from the evidence or from the lack of evidence, the
trial court will be upheld.

Searle v. Searle, 522 P.2d

(Utah 1974); First Sec. Bank of Utah NA v. Wright,

~7

521P.~

563 (Utah 1974); Latimer v. Kalz, 508 P.2d 542 (Utah 1973);
Holly v. Federal American Partners, 507 P.2d 381 (Utah
1973); Brigham v. Moon Lake Electric Assn., 470 P.2d 393
(Utah 1970), see also Tucker v. Nunley cited on pages 16 and
17 herein.
From the record in the present case, the trial court
held in favor of plaintiff-respondent based upon the fact
that essential records of the defendants were not produced
pursuant to discovery and that such records were

peculiar~

within the province and knowledge of defendant Dixon and
therefore the Court shifted the burden to the defendant, a
burden he did not meet.

(Findings of Fact, Conclusions of

Law and Judgment, R. 46-49.)
Accordingly, this Court should affirm the judgment of
the trial court for plaintiff-respondent.
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CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court
properly awarded judgment to plaintiff-respondent; that
there was evidence that defendant-appellant had and received
monies and that there was no evidence that said monies went
to either the corporate defendants or to a third party
customer of defendant Dixon.

If, as appellant urges, de-

fendant Dixon received the money as agent for the defendant
corporations, the corporate veil should be disregarded
because as President, customer's man and registered agent,
he should have been able to produce evidence to indicate
what actually happened to the monies.
Respondent further submits that the trial court properly concluded that failure on the part of the defendants to
produce documents or records raised a presumption that was
unfavorable to appellant and was justified in shifting the
burden of proof to defendant Dixon to disprove respondent's
prima facie case.
Respondent submits that under its pleading, facts and
evidence of this case, no election was required as to which
of the defendants it must pursue for judgment.

Alterna-

tively, even if such election must be made, appellant had
the duty to move for such election.
Finally, respondent submits that the trial court's
findings were based on the preponderance of evidence and
fact and that this Court should affirm the judgment.
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